

Fuel Gas Release

Description of Incident (Occurred June 25, 2022; incident did not occur offshore Atlantic Canada but the learnings are applicable to offshore operations)

A work location was being prepared for an insulation upgrade after integrity inspectors confirmed adequate wall thickness on the fuel gas piping. Prior to the install of the insulation, minor buffing was required on some of the piping. The day shift operator isolated the fuel gas main header and depressurized all gas leaving a 3/4" drain open without lock out tag out (LOTO).

While doing rounds, the night shift panel operator noticed that the fuel gas Crossover Valves (XV's) were closed, however there was no indication as to why. The panel operator opened the XV's to turn the fuel gas back on which released fuel gas into atmosphere through the open 3/4" drain.

Site procedures did not require LOTO as ultrasonic testing confirmed pipe wall thickness was within spec, however the systems were proactively depressurized for external buffing prior to insulation install. The system was handed over unsecured as instruments remained connected to the XV's and were not locked out. There were no handover notes to inform operations staff of the plant's status and the panel operator did not fully understand the status of the fuel gas system prior to opening the XV's.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations

As a result of this incident the operator changed site procedures to require that proper isolation procedures are followed and systems isolated, regardless of whether it is done proactively or per requirements, including LOTO. System/plant status must be included in all handovers to ensure incoming personnel are aware of plant status and operations.

Applicable Lifesaving Rule

IOGP's lifesaving rule on [Energy Isolation](#) relates to this incident. [Read more](#) about IOGP's lifesaving rules.

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